vin13
01-10 09:08 AM
You should be able to contiue your GC without interruption even if you did not work for the sponsoring employer. but just make sure you are employed with the sponsoring employer before filing for I-485.
You may need a new H1 to go back to the previous employer. But GC should not be affected.
You may need a new H1 to go back to the previous employer. But GC should not be affected.
wallpaper Wide Mouth Food Processor
vicente
10-11 09:08 PM
Good question. I'm not sure if the two-year home residency requirement applies to tourist visas.
But if your J-1 program isn't subject to the two year residency requirement, I don't see why there would be a problem.
Warning: I am not a lawyer.
But if your J-1 program isn't subject to the two year residency requirement, I don't see why there would be a problem.
Warning: I am not a lawyer.
pappu
06-28 01:55 PM
Please do not post same question under multiple topics.
2011 KitchenAid 12-Cup Food
Macaca
11-11 08:15 AM
Extreme Politics (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/books/review/Brinkley-t.html) By ALAN BRINKLEY | New York Times, November 11, 2007
Alan Brinkley is the Allan Nevins professor of history and the provost at Columbia University.
Few people would dispute that the politics of Washington are as polarized today as they have been in decades. The question Ronald Brownstein poses in this provocative book is whether what he calls “extreme partisanship” is simply a result of the tactics of recent party leaders, or whether it is an enduring product of a systemic change in the structure and behavior of the political world. Brownstein, formerly the chief political correspondent for The Los Angeles Times and now the political director of the Atlantic Media Company, gives considerable credence to both explanations. But the most important part of “The Second Civil War” — and the most debatable — is his claim that the current political climate is the logical, perhaps even inevitable, result of a structural change that stretched over a generation.
A half-century ago, Brownstein says, the two parties looked very different from how they appear today. The Democratic Party was a motley combination of the conservative white South; workers in the industrial North as well as African-Americans and other minorities; and cosmopolitan liberals in the major cities of the East and West Coasts. Republicans dominated the suburbs, the business world, the farm belt and traditional elites. But the constituencies of both parties were sufficiently diverse, both demographically and ideologically, to mute the differences between them. There were enough liberals in the Republican Party, and enough conservatives among the Democrats, to require continual negotiation and compromise and to permit either party to help shape policy and to be competitive in most elections. Brownstein calls this “the Age of Bargaining,” and while he concedes that this era helped prevent bold decisions (like confronting racial discrimination), he clearly prefers it to the fractious world that followed.
The turbulent politics of the 1960s and ’70s introduced newly ideological perspectives to the two major parties and inaugurated what Brownstein calls “the great sorting out” — a movement of politicians and voters into two ideological camps, one dominated by an intensified conservatism and the other by an aggressive liberalism. By the end of the 1970s, he argues, the Republican Party was no longer a broad coalition but a party dominated by its most conservative voices; the Democratic Party had become a more consistently liberal force, and had similarly banished many of its dissenting voices. Some scholars and critics of American politics in the 1950s had called for exactly such a change, insisting that clear ideological differences would give voters a real choice and thus a greater role in the democratic process. But to Brownstein, the “sorting out” was a catastrophe that led directly to the meanspirited, take-no-prisoners partisanship of today.
There is considerable truth in this story. But the transformation of American politics that he describes was the product of more extensive forces than he allows and has been, at least so far, less profound than he claims. Brownstein correctly cites the Democrats’ embrace of the civil rights movement as a catalyst for partisan change — moving the white South solidly into the Republican Party and shifting it farther to the right, while pushing the Democrats farther to the left. But he offers few other explanations for “the great sorting out” beyond the preferences and behavior of party leaders. A more persuasive explanation would have to include other large social changes: the enormous shift of population into the Sun Belt over the last several decades; the new immigration and the dramatic increase it created in ethnic minorities within the electorate; the escalation of economic inequality, beginning in the 1970s, which raised the expectations of the wealthy and the anxiety of lower-middle-class and working-class people (an anxiety conservatives used to gain support for lowering taxes and attacking government); the end of the cold war and the emergence of a much less stable international system; and perhaps most of all, the movement of much of the political center out of the party system altogether and into the largest single category of voters — independents. Voters may not have changed their ideology very much. Most evidence suggests that a majority of Americans remain relatively moderate and pragmatic. But many have lost interest, and confidence, in the political system and the government, leaving the most fervent party loyalists with greatly increased influence on the choice of candidates and policies.
Brownstein skillfully and convincingly recounts the process by which the conservative movement gained control of the Republican Party and its Congressional delegation. He is especially deft at identifying the institutional and procedural tools that the most conservative wing of the party used after 2000 both to vanquish Republican moderates and to limit the ability of the Democratic minority to participate meaningfully in the legislative process. He is less successful (and somewhat halfhearted) in making the case for a comparable ideological homogeneity among the Democrats, as becomes clear in the book’s opening passage. Brownstein appropriately cites the former House Republican leader Tom DeLay’s farewell speech in 2006 as a sign of his party’s recent strategy. DeLay ridiculed those who complained about “bitter, divisive partisan rancor.” Partisanship, he stated, “is not a symptom of democracy’s weakness but of its health and its strength.”
But making the same argument about a similar dogmatism and zealotry among Democrats is a considerable stretch. To make this case, Brownstein cites not an elected official (let alone a Congressional leader), but the readers of the Daily Kos, a popular left-wing/libertarian Web site that promotes what Brownstein calls “a scorched-earth opposition to the G.O.P.” According to him, “DeLay and the Democratic Internet activists ... each sought to reconfigure their political party to the same specifications — as a warrior party that would commit to opposing the other side with every conceivable means at its disposal.” The Kos is a significant force, and some leading Democrats have attended its yearly conventions. But few party leaders share the most extreme views of Kos supporters, and even fewer embrace their “passionate partisanship.” Many Democrats might wish that their party leaders would emulate the aggressively partisan style of the Republican right. But it would be hard to argue that they have come even remotely close to the ideological purity of their conservative counterparts. More often, they have seemed cowed and timorous in the face of Republican discipline, and have over time themselves moved increasingly rightward; their recapture of Congress has so far appeared to have emboldened them only modestly.
There is no definitive answer to the question of whether the current level of polarization is the inevitable result of long-term systemic changes, or whether it is a transitory product of a particular political moment. But much of this so-called age of extreme partisanship has looked very much like Brownstein’s “Age of Bargaining.” Ronald Reagan, the great hero of the right and a much more effective spokesman for its views than President Bush, certainly oversaw a significant shift in the ideology and policy of the Republican Party. But through much of his presidency, both he and the Congressional Republicans displayed considerable pragmatism, engaged in negotiation with their opponents and accepted many compromises. Bill Clinton, bedeviled though he was by partisan fury, was a master of compromise and negotiation — and of co-opting and transforming the views of his adversaries. Only under George W. Bush — through a combination of his control of both houses of Congress, his own inflexibility and the post-9/11 climate — did extreme partisanship manage to dominate the agenda. Given the apparent failure of this project, it seems unlikely that a new president, whether Democrat or Republican, will be able to recreate the dispiriting political world of the last seven years.
Division of the U.S. Didn’t Occur Overnight (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/books/13kaku.html) By MICHIKO KAKUTANI | New York Times, November 13, 2007
THE SECOND CIVIL WAR How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America By Ronald Brownstein, The Penguin Press. $27.95
Alan Brinkley is the Allan Nevins professor of history and the provost at Columbia University.
Few people would dispute that the politics of Washington are as polarized today as they have been in decades. The question Ronald Brownstein poses in this provocative book is whether what he calls “extreme partisanship” is simply a result of the tactics of recent party leaders, or whether it is an enduring product of a systemic change in the structure and behavior of the political world. Brownstein, formerly the chief political correspondent for The Los Angeles Times and now the political director of the Atlantic Media Company, gives considerable credence to both explanations. But the most important part of “The Second Civil War” — and the most debatable — is his claim that the current political climate is the logical, perhaps even inevitable, result of a structural change that stretched over a generation.
A half-century ago, Brownstein says, the two parties looked very different from how they appear today. The Democratic Party was a motley combination of the conservative white South; workers in the industrial North as well as African-Americans and other minorities; and cosmopolitan liberals in the major cities of the East and West Coasts. Republicans dominated the suburbs, the business world, the farm belt and traditional elites. But the constituencies of both parties were sufficiently diverse, both demographically and ideologically, to mute the differences between them. There were enough liberals in the Republican Party, and enough conservatives among the Democrats, to require continual negotiation and compromise and to permit either party to help shape policy and to be competitive in most elections. Brownstein calls this “the Age of Bargaining,” and while he concedes that this era helped prevent bold decisions (like confronting racial discrimination), he clearly prefers it to the fractious world that followed.
The turbulent politics of the 1960s and ’70s introduced newly ideological perspectives to the two major parties and inaugurated what Brownstein calls “the great sorting out” — a movement of politicians and voters into two ideological camps, one dominated by an intensified conservatism and the other by an aggressive liberalism. By the end of the 1970s, he argues, the Republican Party was no longer a broad coalition but a party dominated by its most conservative voices; the Democratic Party had become a more consistently liberal force, and had similarly banished many of its dissenting voices. Some scholars and critics of American politics in the 1950s had called for exactly such a change, insisting that clear ideological differences would give voters a real choice and thus a greater role in the democratic process. But to Brownstein, the “sorting out” was a catastrophe that led directly to the meanspirited, take-no-prisoners partisanship of today.
There is considerable truth in this story. But the transformation of American politics that he describes was the product of more extensive forces than he allows and has been, at least so far, less profound than he claims. Brownstein correctly cites the Democrats’ embrace of the civil rights movement as a catalyst for partisan change — moving the white South solidly into the Republican Party and shifting it farther to the right, while pushing the Democrats farther to the left. But he offers few other explanations for “the great sorting out” beyond the preferences and behavior of party leaders. A more persuasive explanation would have to include other large social changes: the enormous shift of population into the Sun Belt over the last several decades; the new immigration and the dramatic increase it created in ethnic minorities within the electorate; the escalation of economic inequality, beginning in the 1970s, which raised the expectations of the wealthy and the anxiety of lower-middle-class and working-class people (an anxiety conservatives used to gain support for lowering taxes and attacking government); the end of the cold war and the emergence of a much less stable international system; and perhaps most of all, the movement of much of the political center out of the party system altogether and into the largest single category of voters — independents. Voters may not have changed their ideology very much. Most evidence suggests that a majority of Americans remain relatively moderate and pragmatic. But many have lost interest, and confidence, in the political system and the government, leaving the most fervent party loyalists with greatly increased influence on the choice of candidates and policies.
Brownstein skillfully and convincingly recounts the process by which the conservative movement gained control of the Republican Party and its Congressional delegation. He is especially deft at identifying the institutional and procedural tools that the most conservative wing of the party used after 2000 both to vanquish Republican moderates and to limit the ability of the Democratic minority to participate meaningfully in the legislative process. He is less successful (and somewhat halfhearted) in making the case for a comparable ideological homogeneity among the Democrats, as becomes clear in the book’s opening passage. Brownstein appropriately cites the former House Republican leader Tom DeLay’s farewell speech in 2006 as a sign of his party’s recent strategy. DeLay ridiculed those who complained about “bitter, divisive partisan rancor.” Partisanship, he stated, “is not a symptom of democracy’s weakness but of its health and its strength.”
But making the same argument about a similar dogmatism and zealotry among Democrats is a considerable stretch. To make this case, Brownstein cites not an elected official (let alone a Congressional leader), but the readers of the Daily Kos, a popular left-wing/libertarian Web site that promotes what Brownstein calls “a scorched-earth opposition to the G.O.P.” According to him, “DeLay and the Democratic Internet activists ... each sought to reconfigure their political party to the same specifications — as a warrior party that would commit to opposing the other side with every conceivable means at its disposal.” The Kos is a significant force, and some leading Democrats have attended its yearly conventions. But few party leaders share the most extreme views of Kos supporters, and even fewer embrace their “passionate partisanship.” Many Democrats might wish that their party leaders would emulate the aggressively partisan style of the Republican right. But it would be hard to argue that they have come even remotely close to the ideological purity of their conservative counterparts. More often, they have seemed cowed and timorous in the face of Republican discipline, and have over time themselves moved increasingly rightward; their recapture of Congress has so far appeared to have emboldened them only modestly.
There is no definitive answer to the question of whether the current level of polarization is the inevitable result of long-term systemic changes, or whether it is a transitory product of a particular political moment. But much of this so-called age of extreme partisanship has looked very much like Brownstein’s “Age of Bargaining.” Ronald Reagan, the great hero of the right and a much more effective spokesman for its views than President Bush, certainly oversaw a significant shift in the ideology and policy of the Republican Party. But through much of his presidency, both he and the Congressional Republicans displayed considerable pragmatism, engaged in negotiation with their opponents and accepted many compromises. Bill Clinton, bedeviled though he was by partisan fury, was a master of compromise and negotiation — and of co-opting and transforming the views of his adversaries. Only under George W. Bush — through a combination of his control of both houses of Congress, his own inflexibility and the post-9/11 climate — did extreme partisanship manage to dominate the agenda. Given the apparent failure of this project, it seems unlikely that a new president, whether Democrat or Republican, will be able to recreate the dispiriting political world of the last seven years.
Division of the U.S. Didn’t Occur Overnight (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/books/13kaku.html) By MICHIKO KAKUTANI | New York Times, November 13, 2007
THE SECOND CIVIL WAR How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America By Ronald Brownstein, The Penguin Press. $27.95
more...
Blog Feeds
11-09 03:30 AM
Wendy Sefsaf of the Immigration Policy Center makes the case that the answer is no. And she also lays out the evidence that legalizing those workers would actually raise wages for US workers and contribute to economic growth that will result in more job creation.
More... (http://blogs.ilw.com/gregsiskind/2009/11/would-mass-deportation-mean-more-jobs-for-us-workers-.html)
More... (http://blogs.ilw.com/gregsiskind/2009/11/would-mass-deportation-mean-more-jobs-for-us-workers-.html)
xeixas
08-27 06:23 PM
Has anyone that sent his/her July I485 application to NSC and expect this application to have been transfered to TSC, received a receipt?
more...
gcdesirer
07-29 10:44 AM
Hi,
My family had visited me way back in 2004 on a visitor visa. Due to unavoidable circumstances, they had to stay beyond the stipulated 6 months ( for 2 more months). We had requested the govt. for extension approval and it had been granted then.
We would like to have them visit us again by Nov of this year. However, when they went for the visa to consulate(last week), it got rejected, because the consulate person informed them that they had overstayed last time around.
I would like to know when can I legally apply for the visa again? And is there a way I could enhance my chances of an approval, rather than a rejection, next time I try. I am working on an EAD and my husband had filed for I485 for our family(I140 approved stage).
Any advise would be appreciated.
Regards,
My family had visited me way back in 2004 on a visitor visa. Due to unavoidable circumstances, they had to stay beyond the stipulated 6 months ( for 2 more months). We had requested the govt. for extension approval and it had been granted then.
We would like to have them visit us again by Nov of this year. However, when they went for the visa to consulate(last week), it got rejected, because the consulate person informed them that they had overstayed last time around.
I would like to know when can I legally apply for the visa again? And is there a way I could enhance my chances of an approval, rather than a rejection, next time I try. I am working on an EAD and my husband had filed for I485 for our family(I140 approved stage).
Any advise would be appreciated.
Regards,
2010 KitchenAid Food Processor
redcard
09-13 01:43 PM
Just a thought.. maybe some experts can help..
Does BEC Capture the following information at the time of entering data..
Type of application � Eb2, 3 or Other workers category..
Nationality of application..
My understanding is that BEC does not determine the EB2 or EB3 until the final stage, nor is the nationality captured as part of the older labor process (I could be wrong.).. and if the nationality is captured then an application of an Indian can only be substituted by an Indian???
In case they don�t,,, how can DOS determine the all the 245(i) applications at the BEC are Eb2.. or Eb3.. or for that matter from India. On an optimistic side.. when all the cases at the BEC get cleared in June 07 and DOS realizes that bulk of the cases were for Other Workers Category .. may dates for EB2 and EB3 could make huge movement forward then..
Does BEC Capture the following information at the time of entering data..
Type of application � Eb2, 3 or Other workers category..
Nationality of application..
My understanding is that BEC does not determine the EB2 or EB3 until the final stage, nor is the nationality captured as part of the older labor process (I could be wrong.).. and if the nationality is captured then an application of an Indian can only be substituted by an Indian???
In case they don�t,,, how can DOS determine the all the 245(i) applications at the BEC are Eb2.. or Eb3.. or for that matter from India. On an optimistic side.. when all the cases at the BEC get cleared in June 07 and DOS realizes that bulk of the cases were for Other Workers Category .. may dates for EB2 and EB3 could make huge movement forward then..
more...
vpn
03-11 07:53 AM
I got an H1 from an employer with changes of status from L1 effective 31- jan but I will be joining this company only on 4-april-2011. I continued to work for L1 employer till
20-Feb after which i returned to India.
Now i have my visa interview - will i face issues because of the 25 days i spend with L1 employer and that I dont have H1 employer pay stubs?
20-Feb after which i returned to India.
Now i have my visa interview - will i face issues because of the 25 days i spend with L1 employer and that I dont have H1 employer pay stubs?
hair of the food KitchenAid
Blog Feeds
06-15 03:00 AM
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced today that a new version of the Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card (Form I-90), is available on the USCIS website. The new version of the form is dated 8/10/09 and contains more user-friendly features.
Applicants may file Form I-90 electronically (through e-filing), or through the mail to the USCIS Phoenix Lockbox facility.
More... (http://www.visalawyerblog.com/2010/06/new_form_i90_application_to_re.html)
Applicants may file Form I-90 electronically (through e-filing), or through the mail to the USCIS Phoenix Lockbox facility.
More... (http://www.visalawyerblog.com/2010/06/new_form_i90_application_to_re.html)
more...
anilkumar0902
04-17 08:32 PM
I e-filed my EAD renewal application along with my wife's EAD application on 03/16 and both were approved on 04/07. We both have sequential receipt #s.
However, we received my wife's EAD on 04/12 but not mine. I am the primary application of 485.
Does this happen often ?
However, we received my wife's EAD on 04/12 but not mine. I am the primary application of 485.
Does this happen often ?
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isthereawayout
05-29 08:17 AM
For a EB2 position, that requires a MS with no alternate qualification accepted:
1. Does the business necessity need to show how the job duties match the course work during MS or why the job duties are needed for the company?
2. Do we need to send the business necessity at the time of applying for PERM or only when audited.
Thanks!
1. Does the business necessity need to show how the job duties match the course work during MS or why the job duties are needed for the company?
2. Do we need to send the business necessity at the time of applying for PERM or only when audited.
Thanks!
more...
house Food Processor - cream
Nagireddi
05-01 10:38 AM
I have just received an email from CRIS that my I 140 has been approved.Good luck to everybody.
Country: India
EB2
PD: Dec 2005
1st I 140 approval date: June 2006
Concurrent filing I 140 and I 485 applied on 6th August 2007
2nd I 140 approval date: 30th April 2008
Country: India
EB2
PD: Dec 2005
1st I 140 approval date: June 2006
Concurrent filing I 140 and I 485 applied on 6th August 2007
2nd I 140 approval date: 30th April 2008
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franklin
09-19 11:41 PM
you mean you guys stopped tracking?
I was checking in on the IV boards whilst in DC and didn't see much change in activity on the tracking threads!:cool:
I was checking in on the IV boards whilst in DC and didn't see much change in activity on the tracking threads!:cool:
more...
pictures This individual food processor
coolstonesa
06-02 03:16 PM
Folks, I read somewhere about I-140 premium processing by paying $1000. Is it available now or is it something proposed for future? If not available now, any idea when is it going to be implemented?
Thank for your time.
Thank for your time.
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waiting_4_gc
07-31 07:13 PM
I found the answer to my question but i cant delete my post :(
more...
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sambhajisgayake
01-09 07:24 PM
If anybody can mail me the procedure at sambhajisgayake@yahoo.co.in, i will highly your help.
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Blog Feeds
10-06 01:40 PM
I'm in Spain this week so can't give the full treatment, but thanks to readers who sent this happy news. The US has won the Nobel Prize in medicine for work done by these two scientists as well as Carol Greider. Blackburn is Australian-born and Szostak is British-born. They received their award for genetic research that is described here.
More... (http://blogs.ilw.com/gregsiskind/2009/10/immigrants-of-the-day-elizabeth-blackburn-and-jack-szostak-nobel-medicine-prize-winners.html)
More... (http://blogs.ilw.com/gregsiskind/2009/10/immigrants-of-the-day-elizabeth-blackburn-and-jack-szostak-nobel-medicine-prize-winners.html)
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hmehta
05-21 09:07 AM
Correct me if I am wrong, but there are no ammendments which address the EB based retrogession.
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_109_2.htm
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_109_2.htm
MerciesOfInjustices
12-28 11:36 PM
Enrique's Journey (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5225180) is a very powerful book written by an LA Times journalist about illegal migrants who take the Tren de los muertos, or the Train of the Dead to get to the US.
Will it be the kind of book, like 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncle_Tom's_Cabin) to shake the conscience of a country to generate true Immigration reform? Will it move the likes of even politicians, who have no conscience, and get Immigration Reform accomplished?
I hope so. I had tears all through while reading the excerpts from the book, and hearing Sonia Nazario on NPR today.
As a disclaimer, this is my personal opinion - IV has no position on the issue of illegal immigration.
Will it be the kind of book, like 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncle_Tom's_Cabin) to shake the conscience of a country to generate true Immigration reform? Will it move the likes of even politicians, who have no conscience, and get Immigration Reform accomplished?
I hope so. I had tears all through while reading the excerpts from the book, and hearing Sonia Nazario on NPR today.
As a disclaimer, this is my personal opinion - IV has no position on the issue of illegal immigration.
santa123
09-10 07:34 PM
Folks,
With the recent approvals, does anyone have any approx numbers on EB 2 I & EB3 I pending apps till date?:confused:
Thanks!
With the recent approvals, does anyone have any approx numbers on EB 2 I & EB3 I pending apps till date?:confused:
Thanks!
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